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25X1

January 8, 1974

Chinese Affairs

25X1

CONTENTS

January 8, 1974

Men on the Move	1
Confucius and the Feudal Prince	5
10,000 Chinese Soldiers Go Home	7
Economic Policy in 1973	9
Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, 1973	10
Peking Frowns at New Delhi	12

25X1

New Directions in Computer Development	15
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25X1

Political and Diplomatic Notes	17
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CHRONOLOGY	20
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Men on the Move

25X1A9A

In a routine NCNA radio broadcast reporting provincial new year gatherings, Peking revealed the most sweeping changes in regional military commands since the purge of Lin Biao. A summary of the changes and the major personalities involved is contained in the following two charts. Highlights of the changes include the rotation of seven key military region commanders and the head of the PLA General Political Department, the appointment of three civilian Politburo members to ranking political commissar posts, and the reduction of the number of provinces headed by military men from a previous high of 20 to only 9. An analysis of the implications of this rotation can be found in the *Central Intelligence Bulletin* for January 2, 1974 and the *Central Intelligence Weekly Review* for January 4, 1974.

25X1

The New Line-up in China's Military Regions

Military Region	Old Commander	New Commander	Political Commissars (PC)
Shenyang	Chen Hsi-lien	Li Te-sheng	Tseng Shao-shan
Peking	**	Chen Hsi-lien	*Chi Teng-kuai, 1st PC *Wu Te, 2nd PC Chen Hsien-jui
Tsinan	Yang Te-chih	Tseng Ssu-yu	*Pai Ju-ping, 1st PC *Hsu Li-ching
Wuhan	Tseng Ssu-yu	Yang Te-chih	Wang Liu-sheng, 1st PC
Nanking	Hsu Shih-yu	Ting Sheng	Chang Chun-chiao, 1st PC Tu Ping
Canton	Ting Sheng	Hsu Shih-yu	*Wei Kuo-ching, 1st PC Hua Kuo-feng Kung Shih-chuan Jen Ssu-chung
Lanchow	Pi Ting-chun	Han Hsien-chu	Hsien Heng-han, 1st PC
Foochow	Han Hsien-chu	Pi Ting-chun	Li Chih-min

Chengt'u, Kunming, and Sinkiang Military Regions remain unchanged.

***never publicly identified*

**new title for given individual*

25X1

25X1

Name	Former Position	Current Position	Comments
Li Te-sheng	VC of the party; Member Politburo; Chm Anhwei RC; 1st Sec Anhwei PC; Commander Anhwei MD Director, General Political Dept., PLA	retained " lost " " probably lost Commander Shenyang MR	Li, who was considered a prime candidate for chief of staff, has presumably surrendered all his Anhwei titles and his post as Director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA. At first glance Li's transfer appears to be a demotion, but much of its actual impact will depend on whether Li is awarded the top party position in Liaoning and on the length of his absence from Peking. No replacement for Li in Anhwei and as GPD head in Peking has been announced.
Chen Hsi-lien	Member Politburo; Commander Shenyang MR; Chm Liaoning RC; 1st Sec Liaoning PC	retained lost " " Commander Peking MR	Chen's transfer to Peking may give him a greater role in setting party policies, some of which he has opposed. But his presence in Peking will also allow his opponents to keep a closer watch on him and, in the long run, could lead to his undoing.
Chi Teng-kuei	Member Politburo; Sec Honan PC;	retained retention uncertain 1st Political Commissar Peking MR	Chi is rarely in Honan, but he has until now retained his provincial post. It is not clear if this appointment—a new feather, which increases his prestige and may portend an even larger role for him in Peking—means an end to his Honan associations.
Wu Te	Member Politburo; Chm Peking RC; 1st Sec Peking PC	retained " " 2nd Political Commissar Peking MR	This is an additional appointment for Wu. It will increase his prestige, while permitting him to retain his Peking posts. Nonetheless, while he is the top party man in Peking municipality, he is now subordinate in the military pecking order to civilian Chi Teng-kuei.
Yang Te-chih	1st Sec Shantung PC; Chm Shantung RC; Commander Tsinan MR	lost " " Commander Wuhan MR	Yang's deputy was purged in September, and Yang himself was attacked in big character posters last fall. His transfer may relieve the immediate pressure on him, but the lack of a power base in Wuhan could leave him in an exposed position.
Pai Ju-ping	2nd Sec Shantung PC; VC Shantung RC	retained " 1st Political Commissar Tsinan MR	Pai, a veteran civilian cadre who was promoted to his current provincial party position after the purge of Yuan Sheng-ping last September, may be in line for Yang Te-chih's old Shantung posts.
Tseng Ssu-yu	1st Sec Hupeh PC; Chm Hupeh RC; Commander Wuhan MR	lost " " Commander Tsinan MR	Tseng was one of the most active provincial leaders and appeared to relish his civilian duties. He may be one military officer who will be upset if he does not receive a similar civilian position in his new province. Tseng may have been among the targets of big character posters attacking unnamed provincial leaders in Hupeh.

25X1

Name	Former Position	Current Position	Comments
Ting Sheng	1st Sec Kwangtung PC; Chm Kwangtung RC; Commander Canton MR	lost " " Commander Nanking MR	Ting had difficulty in asserting his authority in Kwangtung. He is likely to have similar trouble in Kiangsu.
Hsu Shih-yu	Member Politburo; 1st Sec Kiangsu PC; Chm Kiangsu RC; Commander Nanking MR	retained lost " " Commander Canton MR	Hsu leaves his factionalized province for another that has not responded well to central directives. During the Cultural Revolution and the Lin crisis, Hsu struggled hard to defeat attempts to replace him. If another attempt is made, Hsu will be in a much weaker position.
Wei Kuo-ching	Member Politburo; 1st Sec Kwangsi PC; Chm Kwangsi RC	retained " " 1st Political Commissar Canton MR	Wei's appointment is an additional title, and he will not have to surrender his present provincial posts. His appointment as 1st political commissar moves him ahead of Hua Kuo-feng, Hunan party boss and fellow Politburo member who is now the second ranking political commissar of Canton MR.
Han Hsien-chu	1st Sec Fukien PC; Chm Fukien RC; Commander Foochow MR	lost " " Commander Lanchow MR	Han has been concerned about challenges to his authority from allies of ex-Fukien boss Yeh Fei. There is no clear number-two man in Fukien to assume Han's old posts, and Yeh, who was recently rehabilitated, may be a leading candidate to succeed him.
Pi Ting-chun	Sec Kansu PC; VC Kansu RC; Commander Lanchow MR	lost " " Commander Foochow MR	Unlike the other rotated MR commanders, Pi is neither a provincial party 1st secretary nor a Revolutionary Committee chairman. Pi commanded the Fukien Front for several years before the Cultural Revolution.

PC -- Party Committee
RC -- Revolutionary Committee
MR -- Military Region
MD -- Military District
VC -- Vice Chairman
Chm -- Chairman

Confucius and the Feudal Prince

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One of the major achievements of Chin Shih Huang-ti, now being touted for his anti-Confucian reforms, was to break the power of the feudal lords who flourished under the Confucian system. History repeated itself last week when the modern-day Emperor Chin (Mao) and his reformist premier (Chou En-lai) engineered a massive reshuffling of regional military commanders. Although the move was part of a protracted effort--gradual until now--to undercut the military's hold on political affairs, it has direct relevance to the recent anti-Confucius campaign.

Most of the statements in the campaign can be read as critical of Chiang Ching, the chief spokesperson for the radical cause. But the campaign also includes attacks on "feudal kingdoms." A ranking Chinese party official has reportedly linked this aspect of the campaign directly to the independence of certain regional military commanders who are not responsive to party direction from Peking. In fact, it is possible that one motive for the timing of the drive was the surprising turn of events last summer, when at least one regional commander made a show of independence by endorsing policies espoused by Chiang Ching and her supporters. Starting in mid-July, the Liaoning provincial radio, apparently speaking on behalf of the then-Manchurian strong man Chen Hsi-lien, waged a fierce campaign against the use of university entrance examinations--a position also taken by the radicals. Chou left the capital to meet with Chen in Liaoning on July 31, and within three days the State Council issued instructions to de-emphasize entrance examinations; just four days later, on August 7, the first of the anti-Confucius articles appeared in *People's Daily*.

Before this summer, Chen apparently had supported the moderate policies initiated by Chou since the Cultural Revolution. From July until his transfer to his new post as Peking Military Region commander at the end of the year, the media in Liaoning were remarkably consistent in their support of radical policies, particularly in the field of education. Among the issues that could have prompted Chen's belligerence was the well-orchestrated drive to dilute his own political power and that of other provincial military men.

In addition to anti-Confucius attacks on feudal kingdoms in general, there is some evidence to suggest that Chen personally is being criticized. In October, an anti-Confucius article praising Wang An-shih, a Sung dynasty political reformer who seems to be a surrogate for Chou, was careful to distinguish between two groups of opponents of Wang. One group was the Confucian "dichards," probably a reference to uncompromising radicals like Chiang Ching, whose opposition came as "no surprise." The other group consisted of "elements within the reformist faction" who had a "change of heart" and attacked Wang "behind his back." This seems to be a

reference to Chen. "As soon as their personal interests were damaged by the reform," the article said, these people "immediately changed sides and joined the diehards" in attacking Wang. Although this could be a reference to Lin Biao, the standard line on Lin is that he was always a traitor, not a one-time loyal supporter who changed sides.

Wang An-shih is one of several reformers being praised in the anti-Confucius campaign, but this particular article has appeared only in the Hong Kong communist newspaper *Tu Kung Pao*. That it has not appeared in China attests to its sensitivity and probably reflects the caution with which Chou must approach the highly charged issue of criticizing a regional commander of Chen's stature. Chen's transfer to Peking will allow Chou to keep a closer watch on him, but it could also enable Chen to parlay his new job into even greater personal power.

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25X1

10,000 Chinese Soldiers Go Home

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Peking, looking toward its long-term interests, is substantially scaling down its military contingent in northern Laos. During the past two months, almost all Chinese anti-aircraft troops have been withdrawn, and both infantry regiments in Laos are now in the process of returning to southern China. These forces had provided security for China's road-building effort, but with the cease-fire they are no longer required. The withdrawals leave some 19,000 Chinese construction and logistic troops maintaining and extending the road network in northern Laos.

The withdrawal is part of Peking's effort to make its presence and activities in Laos more compatible with China's post-war goals: preventing North Vietnamese domination of Indochina, containing Soviet influence, and ensuring that the Lao Government is reasonably sympathetic with Peking's regional goals. China has taken an active role in Lao affairs over the past year, in effect underwriting the Lao agreements and offering whatever government emerges in Vientiane the opportunity to use Peking as a balance against both Hanoi and Moscow.

During the last year or so of hostilities, China supported an end to the fighting and worked behind the scenes to help compose differences;

Peking has strongly supported a negotiated coalition government, even persuading the Soviet ambassador in Vientiane that China's attitude is positive. Peking resumed normal diplomatic contacts with the Souvanna government in 1972 and has promised to dispatch an ambassador when a coalition emerges;

Chinese aircraft brought Pathet Lao personnel to Luang Prabang in implementation of the September protocols between the Lao sides. Previously, Soviet aircraft had been used exclusively to transport Lao Communist personnel;

Chinese diplomats have indicated they are willing to assist peace-keeping efforts;

Peking dispatched a medium-level delegation to visit Communist-controlled northeastern Laos less than a month after North Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan had made a similar trip;

25X1

Aside from these efforts to solidify Peking's position in Vientiane, China plainly intends to maintain its influence in Laos by continuing its road construction

[redacted]

in the north. Chinese diplomats have noted privately for months that this construction has been conducted under a 1962 Sino-Lao agreement. Some of these diplomats have indicated that Peking might wish to alter the scope of its activities and put the road-building project on a more legitimate and durable footing by renegotiating the agreement with a new Lao coalition government. The Chinese, for instance, might seek explicit responsibility for maintenance of the road network and might agree to use civilian labor. The withdrawal of combat units that is now under way is a step toward giving China's presence a less militant cast.

[redacted]

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Economic Policy in 1973

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In spite of unfilled top administrative posts and intensified wrangling between ideologues and moderates, the Chinese Government was able to make far-reaching economic decisions in 1973. These decisions generally favored agriculture and its supporting industries and sacrificed some of China's short-run economic independence in order to achieve self-sufficiency over the long haul.

Grain Import Policy

In 1973, Peking took the unprecedented step of concluding long-term grain import agreements with three traditional suppliers: Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Grain imports totaled 8 million tons in 1973, a sharp rise over the normal 5 million tons. In 1974, imports will be at least 9 million tons. In spite of agreements with other suppliers, China probably will import about as much grain from the US in 1974 as in 1973—about 5 million tons.

Contracts for Industrial Plants on Credit

In 1973, China contracted with non-Communist countries for \$1.1 billion worth of industrial plants, mainly for the manufacture of chemical fertilizers and artificial fibers. This strategy is sound:

Machinery and equipment are much better buys in today's market than grain or fertilizer will be in tomorrow's market;

China will have the necessary petroleum-based raw materials for these plants;

Increased production of artificial fiber will enable Peking to meet the people's requirements for clothing in spite of the recent transfer of cotton acreage to grain.

Outside of a revolving charge account for Western grain and fertilizer, until 1973 Peking could boast of having no foreign debt. Because of the large new contracts for foreign industrial plants, however, China faces deferred payment obligations of \$100 million to \$200 million annually during the late 1970s. Contracts in 1974 are likely to match the volume of 1973. Even so, Peking can readily handle the resulting level of foreign debt.

Stimulation of Exports

In 1973, the government speeded up development of an already rapidly expanding oil industry to take advantage of the favorable international market. Other measures to increase earnings of hard currency were substantial rises in the prices of export goods, encouragement of larger remittances by Overseas Chinese, and greater responsiveness to customer needs in grading, packaging, and labeling.

25X1

January 8, 1974

Chinese Affairs

Page 9

Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, 1973

25X1A9A

During 1973, Peking extended some \$370 million in new economic aid to less developed countries (LDC), bringing the total amount of such aid since 1956 to \$3.2 billion. More than two thirds of the Chinese economic commitments have been made since the beginning of 1970, when China re-emerged on the international scene following the Cultural Revolution.

Most of the 1973 economic aid was concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa to take advantage of local interest there and the lack of competition from highly industrialized donors. More than 85 percent went to five African nations which were accepting Chinese development aid for the first time. Egypt and Syria received almost \$40 million in food grains and hard currency to support their war effort. The number of Chinese technicians in LDC's rose to 23,500 in 1973, with almost 95 percent of them going to Africa.

Most of the new economic aid is being spent on developing light industry and agriculture areas in which the Chinese are well-qualified to specialize in contrast to the heavy industrial projects favored by other Communist donors. Repayment terms continued to be almost unbeatable. The credits are interest-free and are repayable in goods over 15 to 25 years following grace periods of up to ten years. Almost all Chinese military aid is given as grants.

25X1

Chinese Economic Aid Extensions to the Third World

Million US \$

	1960-69	1970	1971	1972	1973	Total 1970-73	Total 1960-73
Total	1,024.4	728.1	562.6	558.0	370.4	2,219.1	3,243.5
Africa	379.0	472.8	358.6	209.8	330.8	1,372.0	1,751.0
Cameroon	—	—	—	—	75.0	—	—
Chad	—	—	—	—	48.6	—	—
Senegal	—	—	—	—	47.8	—	—
Tanzania	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	—
Upper Volta	—	—	—	—	49.0	—	—
Zaire	—	—	—	—	100.0	—	—
Zambia	—	—	—	—	10.0	—	—
Middle East and South Asia	478.6	255.3	34.3	259.2	39.6	588.4	1,067.0
Egypt	—	—	—	—	30.0	—	—
Pakistan	—	—	—	—	0.5	—	—
Syria	—	—	—	—	8.4	—	—
Yemen (Sana)	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	—
East Asia	166.8	—	80.7	—	—	80.7	247.5
Europe	—	—	45.0	—	—	45.0	45.0
Latin America	—	—	44.0	89.0	—	133.0	133.0

25X1

[REDACTED]

Peking Frowns at New Delhi

[REDACTED]

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China continues to demonstrate distinct coolness toward India and to make clear that New Delhi's ties with Moscow are the source of its irritation. Following Brezhnev's visit to India in late November, the Chinese press markedly increased its criticism of Indian policies and of Soviet influence in the subcontinent region:

-Articles on Indian labor difficulties have given New Delhi's economic policies a negative cast;

-The Chinese press has carried excerpts from Indian, Nepalese, and Jammu newspapers that have denounced Moscow's Asian collective security scheme and Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean basin;

-Assertions in the Indian press that the Soviets are obstructing local Indian oil exploration and that India benefits little from local production of Soviet-designed MIG aircraft have received coverage;

An NCNA article strongly criticized continued Soviet operations in Chittagong harbor; and

-Peking resumed press coverage of cross-border raids mounted by dissident Nepalese insurgents from bases on Indian soil, plainly indicating Indian culpability.

25X1

[REDACTED]

Peking is also beginning another round of arms talks with Pakistan. The visit of Army Deputy Chief of Staff Chang Tsai-chien repays the visit of a high-level Pakistani military delegation to Peking in November. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Chang is likely to survey Pakistan's needs in some detail and to discuss delivery arrangements. Additional Chinese assistance may well be forthcoming [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

January 8, 1974

Chinese Affairs

Page 12

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

New Directions in Computer Development

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During October and November, 13 Chinese computer specialists visited leading US computer manufacturers, research and development organizations, semiconductor manufacturers, and computer users. The delegation was primarily interested in key hardware and manufacturing technology potentially important in long-term Chinese computer development programs, and in the US manufacturers and research organizations that could provide this kind of assistance. The Chinese were afforded only brief tours of the US facilities and were exposed to no more know-how than a US firm would show a competitor. Since most of the Chinese were management-level engineers, it is doubtful that they absorbed all the technical details or were able to ask critical questions. They did, however, take copious notes and acquired literature that can be usefully interpreted by specialists at home.

The delegation volunteered very little new information on Chinese computer hardware or development activities, but their interests in specific US technology suggests the likely direction of future Chinese computer development. Currently, only medium-sized computer models of modest performance are available from domestic manufacture. One change will probably involve the development of large, high performance computers to support selected scientific and strategic weapons programs. Small or minicomputers to serve a variety of economic and scientific applications will probably also be developed. To do this, the Chinese must determine the best approaches and identify sources of technology for import.

The Chinese also foresee the need to develop high-quality, high-performance peripheral equipment for computers—such as magnetic tape and disc storage equipment. Peripheral equipment currently in use in China is very limited in quality and performance, and considerable foreign technology and assistance will be required before China can use computers effectively.

25X1

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25X1

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Political and Diplomatic Notes

25X1A9A

New Year's Editorial

The New Year's Day joint editorial was an unilluminating statement that signaled no changes in domestic or foreign policy. Concentrating mainly on domestic affairs, the editorial called for continuing the anti-Confucius campaign, without elaborating on its purpose. It cautiously indicated that intellectuals must continue to remold their thinking, neither criticizing them outright nor praising their earlier contributions. The editorial made a passing reference to the National People's Congress, but gave no hint as to when it might be held.

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Problems in Sino - West German Relations

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Over the past two months, Peking has been lobbying for an exchange of military attaches with West Germany and the establishment of a Chinese consulate in West Berlin. Peking wants the attaches and the consulate for the same reasons that the West Germans are unenthusiastic: either would irritate Moscow and symbolize an improvement in the chilly atmosphere of Sino - West German relations. The West Berlin Senat has reacted negatively to the consulate proposal, but would not object to a trade mission. Over time, exchange of military attaches is probable, but the West Germans seem to be in no hurry.

January 8, 1974

Chinese Affairs

Page 17

The Chinese have recently complained about Nationalist Chinese propaganda in Germany and the degree to which West Germany's decisions are shaped by considerations of Soviet - West German relations. Such protests are not taken seriously by West German officials and clearly reflect Peking's lack of real leverage in Western Europe. [REDACTED]

Support the Army Circular

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This year's "Support the Army and Cherish the People" circular, an annual call for civilians and the army to maintain good relations, contains few compliments for the army. The document, issued on December 31, notes only that the PLA has made "fresh contributions" by strengthening military preparations and has aided socialist revolution and construction. Coming on the same day as the announcement of the rotation of seven powerful regional commanders, a major reduction in the army's political power, this less-than-effusive praise of the military suggests that all the commanders may not have gone willingly and that future troubles with some military men may be anticipated. If the reshuffling had resolved the major political problems associated with the military, the circular would almost certainly have been more glowing. [REDACTED]

25X1

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Pi Returns [REDACTED]

One of the recently rotated military region commanders, Pi Ting-chun, has returned to Fukien, an area where he has strong ties. Pi, a top-ranking officer in Fukien from at least 1961 to October 1969, was aligned with Han Hsien-chen, the previous Fukien military and political boss, during the Cultural Revolution. Pi's transfer to the Lanchow Military Region in 1970 was interpreted as an effort to undermine Han. The latest switch is not necessarily injurious to Han's local organization. The return of Pi may have been the price of Han's agreement to his own transfer to Lanchow—or even part of a plan by some elements in Peking not to disturb the power balance in Fukien. The appointment of a new first secretary in Fukien will shed more light on these questions. [REDACTED]

25X1

Chiang Ching

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On December 27, an NCNA dispatch praised Chiang Ching for her role in revolutionizing piano music. The last time Madame Mao's cultural role was praised by the central media was in September. On both occasions, the NCNA dispatches

were issued only in English. The central media have not paid tribute to Madame Mao for the domestic audience since last May. Leftist positions on policy issues are carried by the central media in Chinese, but personal praise of Chiang Ching, the most outspoken leftist, is limited to those provinces where her support is the strongest. [REDACTED]

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Trade Unions

Reconstruction of provincial trade unions was completed on December 28 when Kwelchow Province announced the opening of its congress. At year's end, two of China's four traditional mass organizations (the Communist Youth League and the trade unions) had been rebuilt in all provinces, and the women's associations will be complete once Shantung holds its congress. Reconstruction of the peasant association is just beginning. Final reconstruction of the mass organizations will not be achieved until a national congress is held for each of the four groups. [REDACTED]

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CHRONOLOGY

Dec 21	Chinese economic delegation arrives in Pakistan, apparently to survey possibilities for new aid. [REDACTED]	25X1
Dec 21-27	Thai trade delegation, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Chan-chai, visits Peking. The Thais talked with Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, and Chiao Kuan-hua and purchased 50,000 tons diesel oil from China. [REDACTED]	25X1
Dec 22	Ministerial-level Ceylonese trade delegation departs after negotiating 1974 rice-rubber barter agreement under which Sri Lanka will receive 200,000 tons of rice. [REDACTED]	25X1
Dec 25	Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets with visiting official from Pakistan Airlines. [REDACTED]	25X1
Dec 28	Kweichow forms last provincial trade union organization (see Notes). [REDACTED]	25X1
Dec 29	Annual trade protocol signed with Albania. [REDACTED]	25X1
Dec 31	Unprecedented rotation of military region commanders revealed at provincial rallies (see article and Notes). [REDACTED]	25X1
Jan 1	Delegation of Chinese doctors leaves for visit to Canada and the US. [REDACTED]	25X1
Jan 1-3	Le Duc Tho passes through Peking en route home from talks with Secretary Kissinger. His host was Keng Piao, and he sees Chang Chun-chiao. [REDACTED]	25X1
Jan 3-6	Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira visits Peking and signs trade agreement. Received by Mao, Chou, Chi Peng-fei. [REDACTED]	25X1
Jan 6	PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Chang Tsai-chien begins visit to Pakistan. [REDACTED]	25X1